

## SIX RAND EXPERTS SUPPORT PULLOUT

Back Unilateral Step Within  
One Year in Vietnam

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS

Special to The New York Times

SANTA MONICA, Calif., Oct. 8 — Six staff members of the Rand Corporation, all of whom have done research on Vietnam for the Federal Government, have urged the United States to make a unilateral withdrawal of its troops from South Vietnam within a year.

In a letter to The New York Times, the six said, "Such disengagement should not be conditioned upon agreement or performance by Hanoi or Saigon — i.e., it should not be subject to veto by either side."

The six said that they were acting as individuals, not as employees of Rand, a nonprofit research corporation established by the Air Force in 1946. The corporation is now independent but still does 76 per cent of its work for the Defense Department.

The letter, written by men of considerable expertise who normally shun publicity, provided new impetus to the growing public demand for swift disengagement from Vietnam.

### Two Years in Saigon

Under contract to the Pentagon, the six have studied subjects ranging from the effectiveness of bombing North Vietnam to the interrogation of enemy prisoners. One of them, Daniel Ellsberg, spent two years working for the State Department in Saigon before joining Rand.

The group includes experts on Russia, China and Japan. One signatory, Melvin Gurtov, is the author of a forthcoming book on the future of American policy in southeast Asia. The other signers are Oleg Hoefding, Arnold L. Horelick, Konrad Kellen and Paul F. Langer.

The letter writers concluded that negotiations could never bring peace to Vietnam and that an unconditional pullout was the only feasible alternative open to Washington. As one of the group commented: "Unilateral withdrawal is now respectable."

The letter listed four reasons, "apart from persuasive moral argument," for rapid American withdrawal:

"No. 1. Short of destroying the entire country and its people, we cannot eliminate the enemy forces in Vietnam by military means; in fact, military victory is no longer the U.S. objective. What should now also be recognized is that the opposing leadership cannot be coerced by the present or by any other available U.S. strategy into making the kinds of concessions currently demanded.

### Exaggeration Is Found

"No. 2. Past U. S. promises to the Vietnamese people are not served by prolonging our inconclusive and highly destructive military activity in Vietnam. This activity must not be prolonged merely on demand of the Saigon government, whose capacity to survive on its own must finally be tested, regardless of outcome.

"No. 3. The importance to the U. S. national interests of the future political complexion of South Vietnam has been greatly exaggerated, as has the negative international impact of the unilateral U. S. military withdrawal.

"No. 4. Above all, the human, political and material costs of continuing our part in the war far outweigh any prospective benefits, and are greater than the foreseeable costs and risks of disengagement."

### Disaster Is Denied

The North Vietnamese, the letter continued, have shown extraordinary "resiliency, determination and effectiveness, even under extremely adverse conditions." Any hope that the enemy is weakening is "erroneous," it went on.

Moreover, the letter said, the North Vietnamese would never accept a settlement that "implied recognition of the authority of the Saigon government."

"Thus to make the end of U. S. involvement contingent upon such concessions is to perpetuate our presence indefinitely," it declared.

Unilateral withdrawal, the letter insisted, would not necessarily have the disastrous consequences predicted by supporters of American policy. Withdrawal could even produce "desirable political changes in Saigon" by eliminating support for a regime not backed by a majority of South Vietnamese and by allowing a "cohesive national consensus" to emerge.

The theory that a massive military effort in Vietnam would prevent "proxy victories" by the Soviet Union or Communist China "has long since been discredited," the letter added.

"Moreover, we regard the Vietnamese insurgency as having special characteristics that cannot be considered typical of or exerting decisive influence on other revolutionary movements in Asia or elsewhere," the letter said.

"We do not predict that only good consequences will follow for Southeast Asia or South Vietnam (or even the United States) from our withdrawal," it declared. "What we do say is that the risks will not be less after another year or more of American involvement, and the human costs will surely be greater."



# Debate on Vietnam: Rhetoric vs. Reality

The Washington Post  
Sunday, October 12, 1969

By Henry Owen

THE LAST FEW weeks have seen a widening gulf between reality and rhetoric in public debate over Vietnam, reminiscent of the advice given armed forces weather trainees during World War II: after completing their theoretical analyses, they were told to look out the window and see what's actually happening.

What's actually been happening about Vietnam?

Item: The process of U.S. withdrawal has begun. The second withdrawal was larger than the first, and future ones will presumably be larger still. Press reports suggest that the United States will withdraw about half of its forces by the end of 1970.

Item: South Vietnamese leaders appear to accept this. They have publicly proclaimed their confidence that they can replace all U.S. ground combat forces by the end of 1970. They ask for a definitive schedule of U.S. withdrawals and material aid, to help them in this task.

Item: U.S. casualties have been way down for two weeks running.

In short, the shift of U.S. forces to a greatly reduced role and level, foreshadowed by Secretary Laird in his *Time* magazine interview, is going forward. One would expect public debate to focus on this process—with the President's supporters pointing with pride to the fact that he has a coherent plan for replacing U.S. forces, and critics asking hard questions about the means of carrying it out and where it leads over the long run. This would be a useful debate. But instead, what we are actually all talking about are two rather unlikely alternatives: total withdrawal of all U.S. forces—ground and air, combat and support—in a year; and an early formal political settlement of the war.

THE REASON for this turn in the debate may be found in that random process which, Tolstoy argued, is the principal shaper of our destinies. It all began when Senator Goodell of New York asked the Congress to resolve that all U.S. forces in Vietnam should be withdrawn before the end of 1970. This was a natural enough expression of his and his constituents' concern over the war. It has not commended itself to most of the Congress; Senator Saxbe of Ohio, a leading critic of the war, evidently spoke for many of his colleagues when he called it unrealistic.

No one expected President Nixon to endorse Senator Goodell's proposal, since it seemed to conflict directly with the administration's Vietnamization strategy. If the United States were to announce that it would withdraw all U.S. troops in little more than a year, the South Vietnamese would despair of filling the gap so quickly; resulting demoralization in Saigon would make it difficult to mobilize the increased South Vietnamese effort needed to make "Vietnamization" work.

But the administration did not base its opposition to Senator Goodell's proposal on these grounds. Instead, it stressed the adverse effect that this proposal would have on prospects for a formal settlement—and asked for a show of national unity, to help get such a settlement more quickly. The administration is right: Hanoi would have little motive to negotiate if it expected all U.S. forces to be out before the end of 1970. But there is a large question as to whether, even if Hanoi did not expect this to happen, a formal political settlement would soon follow.

There is little evidence to suggest that Hanoi has been sacrificing the flower of its manhood for four years just to get free elections in South Vietnam; there is considerable evidence to suggest that it is fighting to reunite what it considers to be one country. If so, it may react to even the most imaginative proposals for free elections about as enthusiastically as Lincoln would have responded to proposals that he settle the Civil War by arranging for the people of the Confederacy to vote on whether they should rejoin the Union. All this doesn't prove that there will never be a political settlement; but it does suggest that it may be a long time coming, if at all, and then probably only after Hanoi has been convinced by prolonged experience that the process of Vietnamization and U.S. withdrawal can go forward successfully.

**CALLS FOR** total early withdrawal and for national unity in seeking an early political settlement thus focus attention on what are, in fact, the least likely outcomes to the war. And while these exchanges about courses of action at the far end of the spectrum take place, the great middle ground of reality, on which both Secretary Laird and former Secretary Clifford focused their proposals for partial withdrawal, tends to get short shrift. The result is twofold:

First: The administration is missing an opportunity to explain—and get credit for—the strategy which it will presumably continue to follow, in the likely absence of early political settlement: a strategy which could produce sharply reduced levels of U.S. involvement, cost and casualties within the next 12 months.

Second: The hard questions which this strategy poses are not being publicly addressed. Should the drawdown of U.S. forces proceed according to a fixed schedule or be determined periodically and pragmatically in light of changing conditions? Should it be geared to the other side's actions at Paris and on the battlefield, or to a unilateral U.S. decision to shift more responsibility to the South Vietnamese? If most or all U.S. ground combat forces are withdrawn by the end of 1970, how much longer should remaining support forces be left in Vietnam, and in what numbers? These and related questions which will have to be faced in the months ahead require intensive public discussion. But they won't get it until the debating gap between rhetoric and reality is greatly narrowed.



March 2nd 1969

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## Breaching the Code

### Rand Analysts' Protest on Vietnam Policy Raises Basic Question of Responsibility

By Joseph Kraft

SANTA MONICA, Calif.—When six analysts from the Rand Corp. drop their slide rules and open their mouths to protest about Vietnam, something important has happened.

For the Rand protest, expressed in letters to the editors of *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, goes beyond the issue of Vietnam to the central moral problem of American public life. It raises the question of the responsibility borne by officials and analysts for the actions and policies of the governments they serve.

RAND, WHICH has its headquarters here in Santa Monica, is one of the oldest and most professional of the research institutions set up by the government after World War II to analyze problems of national security. It derives about 75 per cent of its annual budget from the Department of Defense. It does extensive work with classified material. It has recently begun to do a series of special studies for Henry Kissinger and the National Security Council. Its existence depends on having funds from, and good relations with, the federal government.

In the past, Rand analysts have repeatedly questioned prevailing government policies behind closed doors. Individual Rand staff members have participated in public discussions. But the six men involved in the present letter—Daniel Ellsberg, Melvin Gurtov, Oleg Hoffding, Arnold Horelick, Konrad Kellen and Paul F. Langer—go way beyond the tradition. For they speak out as a group in direct opposition to a government policy which they had not before challenged. They published their letter

over strong opposition from some of Rand's chief executives. And they did so at some risk to their future careers.

The basic argument on Vietnam unfolds in three stages. The first point is that Washington has committed itself to a Saigon regime that does not want peace. As the letter says: "The primary interest of the present Saigon leadership is to perpetuate its status and power, and that interest is not served by seeking an end to hostilities through negotiations but only by continuing the war with U.S. support."

The second point is that the other side cannot be made to negotiate on Saigon's terms. The letter says: "Even if a new strategy should produce military successes in Vietnam, substantially reduce U.S. costs and dampen domestic opposition, Hanoi could not be induced to make any concessions—so long as they implied recognition of the authority of the Saigon government."

The argument concludes with the proposition that, since the United States cannot bring either Hanoi or Saigon to negotiate, this country's best option is to walk away from the war. The letter says: "We believe that the United States should decide now to end its participation in the Vietnam war, completing that total withdrawal of our forces within one year at the most."

THERE IS nothing shocking in these views. They are shared by many high officials in this and previous administrations. What is remarkable is that only a handful of those who have come to believe these ideas have said so in public.

Most have suppressed their true beliefs. They have preferred to play inside politics. They have subscribed to the basic Washington mystique

that fidelity to a President transcends fidelity to convictions on even the most critical issues. They have followed the code of the apparatchik.

The Rand letter is chiefly important as a repudiation of the apparatchik code. The public protest breaches the bureaucratic tradition of mute service even when policy conflicts with conscience. And that crack in the old mystique requires a rethinking in two areas.

FOR ONE thing, the federal government is going to have to develop a more open policy in its relations with outside sources of expertise. The days are gone when good men, with an implicit faith that the United States was on the right side of the Cold War, signed up to do unquestioning research for the national security establishment. If the government wants to have the advice of good men, it is going to have to accept a wide range of questions about basic policy objectives. There is going to have to develop between Washington and the analysts much more of a give-and-take relation.

Conversely, a new obligation is imposed upon those disposed in the past to damn anybody with close ties to the government. Out of that shallow practice there have come sweeping attacks on many institutions doing work for government. But the fact now made manifest in the Rand protest is that these institutions are not uncritical mouthpieces of a monolithic line. They are not Dr. Strangeloves writ large. And thus, more than ever, there is an obligation on those of us with doubts about the government policy not to suspend our disbelief but to be careful, selective and discriminating in criticism.



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## Letters to The Editor

### *A Differing View on U.S. Withdrawal*

In your Letters column last Sunday, some of our Rand colleagues advocated an unconditional total withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam within one year. We wish to make clear that there are others at Rand with equivalent professional experience in Vietnam and Southeast Asia who, as individuals, hold different views as to the preferred U.S. policy.

On Vietnam, as well as other subjects, government sponsors of Rand research have sought diversity of views and analysis from among Rand staff members. The signers of both of these letters have had opportunities for presenting their views in a variety of forms—publicly and in proprietary research.

Our disagreement with the views of our colleagues is fundamental. They underrate the continued relevance and importance of the basic principles that underlie the war in Vietnam. Resisting aggression and the use of force to change political boundaries appears to us no less worthy a principle because it has been difficult to apply in Vietnam. Certainly we have made mistakes, major ones, in Vietnam but we strongly support the guiding purposes behind American policy there.

The past costs we have incurred in lives, dollars and domestic tranquility testify to the seriousness of our purpose and the magnitude of our resolve. It is now perfectly proper for us as a nation to limit the costs we are prepared to bear in the further defense of Vietnam. We believe that there should be a major reduction in our military forces and activities in Vietnam, and this reduced level of effort should not be conditional. But we do not agree that the South Vietnamese are so little capable of ever defending themselves that it is unwarranted to incur some additional costs to permit them the opportunity to do so. And the truth of the matter is that, in part, the improvements still needed in their defense capabilities reflect past U.S. decisions and activities, including over-Americanization of the war.

An unconditional reduction in our forces need not, and should not, be carried out as a policy of despair. There are signs of continuing improvement in the effectiveness of the Saigon government and South Vietnam's armed forces. A responsible reduction in U.S. military support can help to assure the fullest possible contribution to their own defense by the South Vietnamese themselves. Such a reduction can take place with reasonable, not certain, prospects of success.

We share our colleagues' judgment that the North Vietnamese have demonstrated remarkable "resiliency, determination and effectiveness" and that they can be expected to continue to do so in the future. The same can be said of the South Vietnamese. It would be as great an error to base U.S. policy on an overly pessimistic view of the latter as on an overly optimistic view of the former, particularly today when many of the past impediments to South Vietnamese performance have been removed. The South Vietnamese government's "capacity to survive on its own" is, indeed, the test—and one which we believe they can pass with limited, temporary and declining assistance from us. And this is precisely the kind of assistance we should now give—in order to assure the fullest contribution from the South Vietnamese, and in order to limit the costs we must bear. But simply pulling out precipitously leaving behind important military lacunae and the expectation of only half-hearted political support in the future would place crushing, not stimulating, pressure on the Saigon government.

Professional experience, no matter how great, still leaves unresolved uncertainties. The above views reflect both. So do those of our colleagues in their letter.

CHARLES COOPER,  
HANS HEYMANN JR.,  
ALBERT P. WILLIAMS JR.  
and CHARLES WOLF JR.

Santa Monica, Cal.



THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1969

## Four at Rand Ask Gradual Troop Cuts

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS

Special to The New York Times

SANTA MONICA, Calif., Oct. 17—Four staff members of the Rand Corporation disagreed today with six of their colleagues who have called for an unconditional withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam.

The four, all experts on Vietnam and Southeast Asia, said in a letter to The New York Times that the United States should stage a "responsible reduction" in troop strength that would allow the South Vietnamese gradually to assume a larger burden of the fighting.

"We believe that there should be a major reduction in our military forces and activities in Vietnam, and this reduced level should not be conditional," the letter said. "But we do not agree that the South Vietnamese are so little capable of ever defending themselves that it is unwarranted to incur some additional cost to permit them the opportunity to do so.

"And the truth of the matter is that, in part, the improvements still needed in their defense capability reflect past U.S. decisions and activities, including over-Americanization of the war."

The fourth signers of the letter were Charles Cooper, Hans Heymann Jr., Albert P. Williams Jr. and Charles Wolf Jr. They have all visited Vietnam while working for Rand, a nonprofit research corporation that does 76 per cent of its

work for the Defense Department.

The two letters from the Rand staff members are considered significant because the writers have considerable firsthand knowledge of the Vietnam war, and have all worked on Government-financed research. Moreover, they have previously refrained from any public comment on the issue, preferring to channel their suggestions through the Government bureaucracy.

The first letter, calling for unilateral withdrawal, caused considerable upset within Rand, which occupies a tightly guarded building overlooking the Santa Monica beach. The company has recently received several lucrative research contracts from the White House, and some staff members thought the letter would jeopardize the company's confidential relationship with Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national security adviser.

The two groups differed primarily on their assessment of the South Vietnamese Government and army.

"An unconditional reduction in our forces need not, and should not, be carried out as a policy of despair," the second letter asserted. "There are signs of continuing improvement in the effectiveness of the G.V.N. [Saigon Government] and South Vietnam's armed forces. A responsible reduction in U. S. military support can help assure the fullest pos-

sible contribution to their own defense by the South Vietnamese themselves."

The first letter had said that the Saigon leadership was interested only in "perpetuating its status and power." This leadership therefore would not accept a negotiated settlement or broaden its political base and would require almost indefinite American support, the letter said.

"In our view," the second letter said, "our colleagues fundamentally underrate the continued importance of the basic principles underlying the Vietnam War. Certainly we have made serious mistakes, but resisting aggression and the use of force to serve expansionist ends is no less worthy a principle because it has been difficult to apply."

"We share our colleagues' judgment that the North Vietnamese have demonstrated remarkable stamina and that they can be expected to continue to do so," the second group of writers continued. "The same can be said of the South Vietnamese."

"It would be as great an error to base U. S. policy on an overly pessimistic view of the latter as on an overly optimistic view of the former. Simply pulling out precipitously, leaving behind important military gaps, and providing only half-hearted political support in the future, would place crushing, not stimulating, pressure on the G.V.N."



# Vietnam Showdown Averted by Senate Panel

## DEBATE, From A1

Reporters were reminded that Rogers and Laird has assured the committee they would carry out the committee's original request to appear in public hearings—once the President's Monday night speech had been delivered.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), a senior committee member, also told reporters on Tuesday: "I hope the committee hearings can provide an educational forum in an endeavor to ally ourselves with the President to withdraw lock, stock and barrel."

But yesterday, Mansfield also changed his mind.

"What we are not going to do is put on a show. What we are going to do is be as constructive as we can, not for matters of publicity, but for matters of mutual interest. This can be very educational to us, as well as to the nation. I think it's laying a sound ground for a public hearing at the proper time," Mansfield said in an interview.

A poll of committee mem-

bers, Republican and Democratic, indicated that Fulbright and Mansfield indeed had backed away from their Tuesday impatience for an open inquiry. They reportedly joined ranks in deciding that the more "orderly" procedure would be to allow Rogers and Laird to confide as much as they could without the embarrassing glare of television and public listeners.

All involved denied that there had been any requests from the Administration trying to avoid a public confrontation.

"We wanted to avoid a tit-for-tat experience on troop withdrawals," one committee dove explained. Others recalled the bitter polarization over Vietnam the committee had experienced in becoming collectively the leading critic of the Johnson administration's policy.

Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), another committee dove, explained that since President Nixon already had initiated a withdrawal policy the problem now was how to make it complete.

Fulbright suggested that the President "could only do so much in 30 minutes" and so it was necessary for his cabinet members to have a chance to "explain the rationale" of the speech to the committee members.

Fulbright was asked why the committee wasn't requesting an appearance from Henry A. Kissinger, the President's assistant for national security affairs. The senator explained that Kissinger had been asked to appear in the past but begged off because of his "confidential relationship with the President."

Also yesterday, 10 liberal Democratic Congressmen announced they would introduce a resolution to the House next Monday expressing the sense of the Congress that all U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Vietnam "on an orderly and fixed schedule."

Sponsoring the resolution were: Reps. Donald M. Fraser (Munn.), George Brown Jr. (Calif.), Philip Burton (Calif.), John Conyers (Mich.), Bob Eckhardt (Tex.), Don Edwards (Calif.), Robert W. Kasten-

meier (Wis.), Abner J. Mikva (Ill.), Benjamin S. Rosenthal (N.Y.) and William F. Ryan (N.Y.).

After the House concluded its business at 7 p.m. about a dozen Democratic war critics stayed on the floor to engage in a series of speeches expressing their disappointment at the President's Monday night speech. They placed in the Record a statement saying that "the President picked up a fallen standard and proclaimed Nixon's war ... the war he proposes to continue is dismayingly close to Johnson's war."

Also yesterday, Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) criticized the President's Vietnam speech by declaring: "The fact is that President Nixon has no policy for Asia, and no plan for ending the war. The fact is that the so-called 'Nixon Doctrine' is no different from the Dulles Doctrine or the Rusk Doctrine, predicated upon the threat of nuclear retaliation, a readiness to police the world with men and arms either directly or subversively ..."

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